Machine learning algorithms may radically improve our ability to diagnose and treat disease. For moral, legal, and scientific reasons, it is essential that doctors and patients be able to understand and explain the predictions of these models. Scalable, customisable, and ethical solutions can be achieved by working together with relevant stakeholders, including patients, data scientists, and policy makers.

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic brought global disruption to every aspect of society including healthcare, supply chain, the economy, and social interaction. Among the many emergent considerations were the safety and public health of the public, patients, essential workers, and healthcare professionals. In certain locations, clinical research was halted—or terminated—in deference to the immediate needs of patient care, and clinical trials focusing on the treatment and prevention of coronavirus infection were prioritized over studies focusing on other diseases. Difficult (...) decisions were made rapidly; flexibility and reconsideration were necessary not only because the intensity and severity of infection varied over time and by locale but also because knowledge of the disease and understanding of its treatment grew. Here we discuss the ethical challenges in decision-making and competing ethical tensions during the pandemic in an effort to advance future preparedness. (shrink)

The Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization Supreme Court decision not only upended constitutional protections for abortion in the United States but also bolstered legislative and cultural int...

These two texts come from a store of papyrus fragments which are at present being examined and worked over at Oxford. They are the property of the Egypt Exploration Society and will be republished in vol. xxxi of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri as Nos. 2544 and 2534; permission for their separate publication here has been granted by the Society in view of the relevance of the former of them to the article by Mr. W. S. Barrett which appears on pp. 58–71 (...) below. We are much indebted to Mr. Barrett and Professor Hugh Lloyd-Jones for many valuable suggestions and criticisms. The nature of both texts was recognized by R. A. Coles, of Magdalen College, Oxford, one of the collaborators in this article. (shrink)

R. G. Bury’s translations of Sextus Empiricus for the Loeb Library have served English language readers well, but new translations, taking account of advances in scholarship since Bury’s day, have long been needed. We now have two new English versions of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. They take different and in some ways complementary approaches to the task.

Forty years ago the majority of prospective teachers in the UK pursued a four year degree course (B.Ed). The situation has now dramatically changed. Most qualified teachers are graduates who gain a...

A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall—any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes’s Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad—by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a (...) non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad—it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad—it reduces a person’s overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior—lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference. (shrink)

Introduction Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood 1. The Stoics on the origin of language and the foundations of etymology James Allen 2. Stoic linguistics, Plato's Cratylus, and Augustine's De dialectica A. A. Long 3. Epicurus and his predecessors on the origin of language Alexander Verlinsky 4. Lucretius on what language is not Catherine Atherton 5. Communicating cynicism: Diogenes' gangsta rap Ineke Sluiter 6. Common sense: concepts, definition and meaning in and out of the Stoa Charles Brittain 7. Varro's anti-analogist David (...) Blank 8. The Stoics on fallacies of equivocation Susanne Bobzien 9. What is a disjunction? Jonathan Barnes 10. Theories of language in the Hellenistic age and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Sten Ebbesen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Phenomenology and Modern Behavioral PsychologyLindsay B. Fletcher (bio) and Steven C. Hayes (bio)Keywordsacceptance, contextualism, defusion, relational-frame-theoryPérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) deserve praise for examining the philosophical roots of clinical psychological science. Modern psychology has moved away from the development of philosophy and theory that is needed to ground scientific investigation within a coherent system. The result is increasingly ill-defined constructs and research programs that each operate within their own divergent (...) paradigm. B.F. Skinner is one of the few modern experimental behavioral psychologists who attempted to build a coherent science of behavior based on observable events with testable hypotheses. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 1999) and its associated basic science of cognition, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 2001), build on Skinner’s work to produce a more progressive science.Psychology and philosophy are different disciplines and how they are approached is defined by the objective. The purpose of philosophy from a scientific point of view is not the same as from a philosophical point of view. It is fine to compare radical behaviorism and phenomenology, but it seems important to ask whether and how this will lead to a more progressive science of behavior.In this commentary, we discuss the philosophy and theory that underlie ACT/RFT and show how they reflect on the relevant points made by the authors regarding the shared features of phenomenology and radical behaviorism. We make two adjustments to the explanation of radical behavioral concepts presented in the current paper to create a more coherent analysis. Finally, we show here how the development of a theory based on applied goals directly informs the methods used in clinical settings.Philosophical AssumptionsThe field of behavior analysis that originated with Skinner has different strands. Some are holistic and pragmatic, whereas others are elementalistic and mechanistic (Hayes, Hayes, and Reese 1988). ACT is based on an a-ontological philosophy termed functional contextualism (Hayes 1993), which views behavior analysis from a holistic and pragmatic perspective. Functional contextualism (AKA radical behaviorism) shares some of the assumptions of phenomenology, as has long been noted (Day 1969). For example, Pérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) identify a-dualism, or monism, as a common feature. In functional contextualism, the whole is divided into functional units for the purpose of prediction and influence. A three-term contingency (antecedent–behavior–consequence) in behavior analysis is viewed as a [End Page 255] whole event with pragmatically distinguishable aspects, not an assemblage. As the authors point out, this results in a dialectic tension between stimulus control, action, and reinforcer because none are distinct units, and each is defined with reference to the others much as the front of a coin cannot exist without the back. These are not ontological entities, but functional units that are abstracted from the whole for pragmatic purposes. What is “radical” about radical behaviorism is that the philosopher, psychologist, or researcher participates in the event they are observing, and their own acts of scientific observation are identified based on their own functional properties.Behavioral ThinkingIn the service of further developing this philosophical and theoretical foundation and considering it along side phenomenology, we need to examine two aspects of the target article. The first regards the role of the environment in shaping behavior that is central to behavioral and contextual theories. The authors object to behaviorism’s notion of environment and suggest replacing it with the concept of the world, stating that “animals have environment, but man has world.” What is missing is an account of that shift. We believe that modern behavior analysis provides that account.Similarly, the paper argues that “reinforcers are not just things that follow behavior, but also, and above all, values that guide our life.” Again what is missing is an account of the precise behavioral basis for the distinction.In an attempt to do this, the authors incorrectly analyze operant behavior as future oriented, even appealing to final causality. In the three-term contingency, the discriminative stimulus sets the occasion for reinforcement of a particular behavior. The behavior of interest has been reinforced in similar contexts in the past, which gives... (shrink)

Some propositional attitude verbs require that the complement contain some “subjective predicate”. In terms of the theory proposed by Lasersohn, these verbs would seem to identify the “judge” of the embedded proposition with the matrix subject, and there have been suggestions in this direction. I show that it is possible to analyze these verbs as setting the judge and doing nothing more; then according to whether a judge index or a judge argument is assumed, unless the complement contains a subjective (...) predicate, the whole matrix is redundant or there is a type conflict. I further show that certain clear facts argue for assuming a judge argument which can be filled by a contextually salient entity–or by the subject of a subjective attitude verb. (shrink)

This paper is intended to stimulate debate amongst stakeholders in the international research community on the topic of returning individual genetic research results to study participants. Pharmacogenetics and disease genetics studies are becoming increasingly prevalent, leading to a growing body of information on genetic associations for drug responsiveness and disease susceptibility with the potential to improve health care. Much of these data are presently characterized as exploratory (non‐validated or hypothesis‐generating). There is, however, a trend for research participants to be permitted (...) access to their personal data if they so choose. Researchers, sponsors, patient advocacy groups, ethics committees and regulatory authorities are consequently confronting the issue of whether, and how, study participants might receive their individual results. Noted international ethico‐legal guidelines and public policy positions in Europe and the United States are reviewed for background. The authors offer ‘Points‐to‐Consider’ regarding returning research results in the context of drug development trials based on their knowledge and experience. These considerations include: the clinical relevance of data, laboratory qualifications, informed consent procedures, confidentiality of medical information and the competency of persons providing results to participants. The discussion is framed as a benefit‐to‐risk assessment to balance the potential positive versus negative consequences to participants, while maintaining the integrity and feasibility of conducting genetic research studies. (shrink)

Two main methods for analysing de re readings of definite descriptions in intensional contexts coexist: that of evaluating the description in the actual world, whether by means of scope, actuality operators, or non-local world binding, and that of substituting another description, usually one expressing a salient or ‘vivid’ acquaintance relation to an attitude holder, prior to evaluation. Recent work on so-called descriptive indexicals suggests that contrary to common assumptions, both methods are needed, for different ends. This paper aims to show (...) that there is indeed a division of labour between the two methods of analysis and to identify criteria for choosing among alternative ways to model the second, substitutional method. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is intended to stimulate debate amongst stakeholders in the international research community on the topic of returning individual genetic research results to study participants. Pharmacogenetics and disease genetics studies are becoming increasingly prevalent, leading to a growing body of information on genetic associations for drug responsiveness and disease susceptibility with the potential to improve health care. Much of these data are presently characterized as exploratory (non‐validated or hypothesis‐generating). There is, however, a trend for research participants to be (...) permitted access to their personal data if they so choose. Researchers, sponsors, patient advocacy groups, ethics committees and regulatory authorities are consequently confronting the issue of whether, and how, study participants might receive their individual results. Noted international ethico‐legal guidelines and public policy positions in Europe and the United States are reviewed for background. The authors offer ‘Points‐to‐Consider’ regarding returning research results in the context of drug development trials based on their knowledge and experience. These considerations include: the clinical relevance of data, laboratory qualifications, informed consent procedures, confidentiality of medical information and the competency of persons providing results to participants. The discussion is framed as a benefit‐to‐risk assessment to balance the potential positive versus negative consequences to participants, while maintaining the integrity and feasibility of conducting genetic research studies. (shrink)

How questions are understudied in philosophy and linguistics. They can be answered in very different ways, some of which are poorly understood. Jaworski identifies several types: ‘manner’, ‘method, means or mechanism’, ‘cognitive resolution’, and develops a logic designed to enable us to distinguish among them. Some key questions remain open, however, in particular, whether these distinctions derive from an ambiguity in how, from differences in the logical structure of the question or from contextual underspecification. Arguing from two classes of responses, (...) adverbs and by gerunds, I give the answer that the logical structure of the question is indeed relevant: loosely, manners are adjuncts but methods are arguments. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century, the concept of natural law was linked with that of “innate ideas”. Natural laws were said to be ideas imprinted by nature or by God on men's minds and were the very foundation of religion and morality. Locke's attack on innate ideas in the first book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is therefore considered to be an assault on natural law. Modern critics like Peter Laslett, W. von Leyden and Philip Abrams are of the opinion (...) that Locke's critique of innate ideas in the Essay cannot be reconciled with the concept of natural law in the Two Treatises of Government. (shrink)

In a Preface, the translator says: “This is a translation of all of Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’être et le Néant.” She earned hard and earned well the right to make this satisfied statement. It was a task of intimidating dimensions. Sartre’s vocabulary and style, in this, his major philosophical opus, are grim, graceless and disheartening. Seldom has the French language had to suffer so much in giving birth to a philosopher’s ideas. American translations of the minor works, hitherto available, have sometimes (...) had the effect of making the obscure absurd; their explanatory introductions have sometimes been quite silly. Of Miss Barnes’s translation, it must be said that she has succeeded admirably in being both accurate and readable. She has not just transposed Sartre’s words but his thought into an English which “reads English” and not just transliterated French, and which makes Sartre not less understandable in translation than he was in the original. Where the translation remains barely intelligible, the fault is not hers. The Introduction, too, is of high quality and gives us, in forty pages, an intelligent exposition and acute appraisal of Sartre’s ontology which compares favourably with anything hitherto written about Sartre in English. There is a useful and accurate glossary of technical terms of Sartrean philosophy and a Name Index which give the English volume important advantages over the French. (shrink)

The merit of Plato’s Laws remains largely untapped by those seeking genuinely collaborative models of the doctor–patient tie as alternatives to paternalism and autonomy. A persistent difficulty confronting proposed alternatives has been surpassing the notion of pronounced intellectual and values asymmetry favoring the doctor. Having discussed two prominent proposals, both of which evince marked paternalism, I argue that reflection on Plato yields four criteria that a genuinely collaborative model must meet and suggest how the Laws addresses them. In the process, (...) the Laws’ doctor–patient tie is shown to be far more nuanced than interpreters have previously observed. Although Plato’s account will not solve our own quandaries, it illustrates how one might retain asymmetry of a kind without capitulating to familiar oppositional modalities. Through this account, I hope to show that the Laws merits fuller inclusion in contemporary discussions than it has heretofore received. (shrink)

abstract In 2002 Diane Pretty went to the European Court of Human Rights to gain a ruling about assisted suicide. In the course of this she argued that the right to life implied a right to die. This paper will consider, from an ethical rather than a legal point of view, how the right to life might imply (or not) a right to die, and whether this includes either a right that others shall help us die, or a right against (...) non‐interference if others are willing to help us. It does this by comparing the right to life to conceptions of property rights. This is not because I think human life is property, but because some of our ways of talking and thinking about our control over our own lives seem to be similar to our thoughts about our control over our own property. The right to life has traditionally been taken as a negative right, that is a right that others not deprive us of life. Pretty's argument, however, seems to be moving towards a positive right, not just to remain alive, but to be enabled in doing what we want to with our lives, and thus disposing of them if we so choose. The comparison with property rights suggests that the right to die only applies if our lives are ours absolutely, and may itself be modified by the suggestion that suicide harms all of us by devaluing human life in general. (shrink)

The type of mood or tense marking that causes counterfactuality inferences—as figuring prominently, but far from exclusively, in counterfactual conditionals—has not yet received a comprehensive and compositional analysis. Focusing on four languages, the paper presents under-appreciated facts and a novel theory where the mood serves to activate alternatives to modal operators, particularly one: the identity operator, often giving rise to counterfactual implicatures.